47 U.S.C. § 230 The Internet allows people everywhere to connect, share ideas, and advocate for change without needing immense resources or technical expertise. Our unprecedented ability to communicate online—on blogs, social media platforms, and educational and cultural platforms like Wikipedia and the Internet Archive—is not an accident. Congress recognized that for user speech to thrive on the Internet, it had to protect the services that power users’ speech. That’s why the U.S. Congress passed a law, Section 230 (originally part of the Communications Decency Act), that protects Americans’ freedom of expression online by protecting the intermediaries we all rely on. It states: "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)). Section 230 embodies that principle that we should all be responsible for our own actions and statements online, but generally not those of others. The law prevents most civil suits against users or services that are based on what others say. Congress passed this bipartisan legislation because it recognized that promoting more user speech online outweighed potential harms. When harmful speech takes place, it’s the speaker that should be held responsible, not the service that hosts the speech. Section 230’s protections are not absolute. It does not protect companies that violate federal criminal law. It does not protect companies that create illegal or harmful content. Nor does Section 230 protect companies from intellectual property claims. Section 230 Protects Us All For more than 25 years, Section 230 has protected us all: small blogs and websites, big platforms, and individual users. The free and open internet as we know it couldn’t exist without Section 230. Important court rulings on Section 230 have held that users and services cannot be sued for forwarding email, hosting online reviews, or sharing photos or videos that others find objectionable. It also helps to quickly resolve lawsuits cases that have no legal basis. Congress knew that the sheer volume of the growing Internet would make it impossible for services to review every users’ speech. When Section 230 was passed in 1996, about 40 million people used the Internet worldwide. By 2019, more than 4 billion people were online, with 3.5 billion of them using social media platforms. In 1996, there were fewer than 300,000 websites; by 2017, there were more than 1.7 billion. Without Section 230’s protections, many online intermediaries would intensively filter and censor user speech, while others may simply not host user content at all. This legal and policy framework allows countless niche websites, as well as big platforms like Amazon and Yelp to host user reviews. It allows users to share photos and videos on big platforms like Facebook and on the smallest blogs. It allows users to share speech and opinions everywhere, from vast conversational forums like Twitter and Discord, to the comment sections of the smallest newspapers and blogs. Content Moderation For All Tastes Congress wanted to encourage internet users and services to create and find communities. Section 230’s text explains how Congress wanted to protect the internet’s unique ability to provide “true diversity of political discourse” and “opportunities for cultural development, and… intellectual activity.” Diverse communities have flourished online, providing us with “political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.” Users, meanwhile, have new ways to control the content they see. Section 230 allows for web operators, large and small, to moderate user speech and content as they see fit. This reinforces the First Amendment’s protections for publishers to decide what content they will distribute. Different approaches to moderating users’ speech allows users to find the places online that they like, and avoid places they don’t. Without Section 230, the Internet is different. In Canada and Australia, courts have allowed operators of online discussion groups to be punished for things their users have said. That has reduced the amount of user speech online, particularly on controversial subjects. In non-democratic countries, governments can directly censor the internet, controlling the speech of platforms and users. If the law makes us liable for the speech of others, the biggest platforms would likely become locked-down and heavily censored. The next great websites and apps won’t even get started, because they’ll face overwhelming legal risk to host users’ speech. Learn More About Section 230 Most Important Section 230 Legal Cases Section 230 is Good, Actually How Congress Censored the Internet With SESTA/FOSTA Here's an infographic we made in 2012 about the importance of Section 230.
I am seeing a lot of fearmongering and misinformation regarding recent events (CSAM being posted in now closed large lemmy.world communities). I say this as someone who brought attention to this with other admins as I noticed things were federating out.
Yes, this is an issue and what has happened in regards to CSAM is deeply troubling but there are solutions and ideas being discussed and worked on as we speak. This is not just a lemmy issue but an overall internet issue that affects all forms of social media, there is no clear cut solution but most jurisdictions have some form of safe harbor policy for server operators operating in good faith.
A good analogy to think of here is if someone was to drop something illegal into your yard that is open to the public. If someone stumbled upon said items you aren’t going to be hunted down for it unless there is evidence showing you knew about the items and left them there without reporting them or selling/trading said items. If someone comes up to you and says “hey, there’s this illegal thing on your property” you report it and hand it over to the relevant authorities and potentially look at security cameras if you have any and send them over with the authorities then you’d be fine.
A similar principle exists online, specifically on platforms such as this. Obviously the FBI is going to raid whoever they want and will find reasons to if they need to, but I can tell you for near certainty they probably aren’t as concerned with a bunch of nerds hosting a (currently) niche software created by 2 communists as a pet project that gained popularity over the summer because a internet business decided to shoot itself in the foot. They are specifically out to find people who are selling, trading, and making CSAM. Those that knowingly and intentionally distribute and host such content are the ones that they are out for blood for.
I get it. This is anxiety inducing especially as an admin, but so long as you preserving and reporting any content that is brought to your attention in a timely manner and are following development and active mitigation efforts, you should be fine. If you want to know in more detail click the link above.
I am not a lawyer, and of course things vary from country to country so it’s a good idea to check from reputable sources on this matter as well.
As well, this is a topic that is distressing for most normal well adjusted people for pretty obvious reasons. I get the anxiety over this, I really do. It’s been a rough few days for many of us. But playing into other peoples anxiety over this is not helping anyone. What is helping is following and contributing the discussion of potential fixes/mitigation efforts and taking the time to calmly understand what you as an operator are responsible for within your jurisdiction.
Also, if you witnessed the content being discussed here no one will fault you for taking a step away from lemmy. Don’t sacrifice your mental health over a volunteer project, it’s seriously not worth it. Even more so if this has made you question self hosting lemmy or any other platform like it, that is valid as well as it should be made more clearer that this is a risk you are taking on when making any kind of website that is connected to the open internet.
I think its also a good prompt, as a self hoster, to assess what services you are hosting and what kind of risk profile that exposes you to. Making yourself aware of any regulations or legal implications and their potential consequences (if any) may mean that self hosting a service becomes much less fun/cool and not worth it.
To expand the conversation; NOTE: I am NOT a Lawyer
People hosting a federated instance in Australia would likely be classed as a Social Media service and be bound by the relevant safety code on the eSafety commissioners site here: https://www.esafety.gov.au/industry/codes/register-online-industry-codes-standards. This is planned to take effect in December 2023 but serves as a guide.
First perform an assessment on your risk factor to determine a Tier (1,2,3) which dictates your required actions. Services that assess between tiers should assume higher risk, which means, potentially, you may be classed higher risk due to the general nature of the content (its not a club so conversation is around a specific topic).
Minimum compliance (assuming you are classed as a Tier 3 Social Media Service)
Section 7, Objective 1, Outcome 1.1 and Outcome 1.5:
Should you be determined to be Tier 2 or 1, there are a whole raft of additional actions including ensuring you are staffed to oversee the safety (1.4), and child account protections (1.7) (preventing unwanted contact), and active detection of CSAM material (1.8)
1.1
Notifying appropriate entities about class 1A material on their services
If a provider of a social media service:
a) identifies CSEM and/or pro-terror materials on its service; and
b) forms a good faith belief that the CSEM or pro-terror material is evidence of serious
and immediate threat to the life or physical health or safety of an adult or child in
Australia,
it must report such material to an appropriate entity within 24 hours or as soon as
reasonably practicable.
An appropriate entity means foreign or local law enforcement (including, Australian
federal or state police) or organisations acting in the public interest against child sexual
abuse, such as the National Centre for Missing and Exploited Children (who may then
facilitate reporting to law enforcement).
Note: Measure 1 is intended to supplement any existing laws requiring social media service providers
to report CSEM and pro-terror materials under foreign laws, e.g., to report materials to the National
Centre for Missing and Exploited Children and/or under State and Territory laws that require reporting
of child sexual abuse to law enforcement.
Guidance:
A provider should seek to make a report to an appropriate entity as soon as reasonably
practicable in light of the circumstances surrounding that report, noting that the referral of
materials under this measure to appropriate authorities is time critical. For example, in
some circumstances, a provider acting in good faith, may need time to investigate the
authenticity of a report, but when a report has been authenticated, an appropriate authority
should be informed without delay. A provider should ensure that such report is compliant
with other applicable laws such as Privacy Law.
1.5
Safety by design assessments
If a provider of a social media service:
a) has previously done a risk assessment under this Code and implements a significant
new feature that may result in the service falling within a higher risk Tier; or
b) has not previously done a risk assessment under this Code (due to falling into a
category of service that does not require a risk assessment) and subsequently
implements a significant new feature that would take it outside that category and
require the provider to undertake a risk assessment under this Code,
then that provider must (re)assess its risk profile in accordance with clause 4.4 of this Code
and take reasonable steps to mitigate any additional risks to Australian end-users
concerning material covered by this Code that result from the new feature, subject to the
limitations in section 6.1 of the Head Terms.
You are not logged in. However you can subscribe from another Fediverse account, for example Lemmy or Mastodon. To do this, paste the following into the search field of your instance: !selfhosted@lemmy.world
A place to share alternatives to popular online services that can be self-hosted without giving up privacy or locking you into a service you don’t control.
Rules:
Be civil: we’re here to support and learn from one another. Insults won’t be tolerated. Flame wars are frowned upon.
No spam posting.
Posts have to be centered around self-hosting. There are other communities for discussing hardware or home computing. If it’s not obvious why your post topic revolves around selfhosting, please include details to make it clear.
Don’t duplicate the full text of your blog or github here. Just post the link for folks to click.
Submission headline should match the article title (don’t cherry-pick information from the title to fit your agenda).
I think its also a good prompt, as a self hoster, to assess what services you are hosting and what kind of risk profile that exposes you to. Making yourself aware of any regulations or legal implications and their potential consequences (if any) may mean that self hosting a service becomes much less fun/cool and not worth it.
To expand the conversation; NOTE: I am NOT a Lawyer
People hosting a federated instance in Australia would likely be classed as a Social Media service and be bound by the relevant safety code on the eSafety commissioners site here: https://www.esafety.gov.au/industry/codes/register-online-industry-codes-standards. This is planned to take effect in December 2023 but serves as a guide.
First perform an assessment on your risk factor to determine a Tier (1,2,3) which dictates your required actions. Services that assess between tiers should assume higher risk, which means, potentially, you may be classed higher risk due to the general nature of the content (its not a club so conversation is around a specific topic).
Minimum compliance (assuming you are classed as a Tier 3 Social Media Service)
Section 7, Objective 1, Outcome 1.1 and Outcome 1.5:
Should you be determined to be Tier 2 or 1, there are a whole raft of additional actions including ensuring you are staffed to oversee the safety (1.4), and child account protections (1.7) (preventing unwanted contact), and active detection of CSAM material (1.8)
1.1
Notifying appropriate entities about class 1A material on their services
If a provider of a social media service:
a) identifies CSEM and/or pro-terror materials on its service; and
b) forms a good faith belief that the CSEM or pro-terror material is evidence of serious
and immediate threat to the life or physical health or safety of an adult or child in
Australia,
it must report such material to an appropriate entity within 24 hours or as soon as
reasonably practicable.
An appropriate entity means foreign or local law enforcement (including, Australian
federal or state police) or organisations acting in the public interest against child sexual
abuse, such as the National Centre for Missing and Exploited Children (who may then
facilitate reporting to law enforcement).
Note: Measure 1 is intended to supplement any existing laws requiring social media service providers
to report CSEM and pro-terror materials under foreign laws, e.g., to report materials to the National
Centre for Missing and Exploited Children and/or under State and Territory laws that require reporting
of child sexual abuse to law enforcement.
Guidance:
A provider should seek to make a report to an appropriate entity as soon as reasonably
practicable in light of the circumstances surrounding that report, noting that the referral of
materials under this measure to appropriate authorities is time critical. For example, in
some circumstances, a provider acting in good faith, may need time to investigate the
authenticity of a report, but when a report has been authenticated, an appropriate authority
should be informed without delay. A provider should ensure that such report is compliant
with other applicable laws such as Privacy Law.
1.5
Safety by design assessments
If a provider of a social media service:
a) has previously done a risk assessment under this Code and implements a significant
new feature that may result in the service falling within a higher risk Tier; or
b) has not previously done a risk assessment under this Code (due to falling into a
category of service that does not require a risk assessment) and subsequently
implements a significant new feature that would take it outside that category and
require the provider to undertake a risk assessment under this Code,
then that provider must (re)assess its risk profile in accordance with clause 4.4 of this Code
and take reasonable steps to mitigate any additional risks to Australian end-users
concerning material covered by this Code that result from the new feature, subject to the
limitations in section 6.1 of the Head Terms.