They should build a factory in Canada like the rest of the autos. Then labor practices and safety will follow Canadian standards, and more of the significant purchase price will remain in our local economy. That will also level the playing field with other Canadian made cars instead of decimating the future of the industry, since lower cost EVs are far from profitable yet. Yes #FuckCars and all that, but there always will be a need for cars even if we drive fewer of them. It’s good to be able to build EVs in Canada. The neoliberal dream that we can offshore and buy things made anywhere in the world while having people in our economy flourish has failed. Doing more of it won’t make it work.
The PRC intentionally deflated private companies that it felt needed deflation (e.g. construction sector) so it’s probably unsurprising that the private sector decreased in size.
China doesn’t need continual FDI. They need FDI to speedrun manufacturing and technology development instead of having to do all the R&D needed to get it. This implies that the need for FDI will decrease over time as China learns how to build the things it previously couldn’t. The PRC does not seem interested in making money for foreign investors other than when they want to get their know-how.
BTW in my anecdata I’ve yet to have a failure on any of my SanDisk Extreme Pro SD cards. I have 4 in active use on different Pi 4s. The oldest one is in use since 2018-ish. It used to be a NAS till 2022 so roughly 3-4 years of 24/7 use with a bog-standard OS. It’s now running OpenWrt which does fewer writes.
Yeah, you’re right, if it’s meant as disks-only, then TPM is the easy solution.
I think SSH unlocked LUKS at boot might be a decent compromise, with the SSH server at a different physical location.
I mean, TPM-locked machine with all the other parts configured correctly should be reasonably secure. It would boot without interaction and be available on the network. It would require a sophisticated and motivated actor to find a vulnerability in one of the systems in the boot chain to get in. That’s probably good enough for preventing data leaks from theft. But the user has to make sure the whole boot chain is configured securely.
If someone can login as root on that machine, by for example rebooting in recovery mode, they can also run the script and access the drives. Or they can get the password from the keyring. A keyring that doesn’t require a password to unlock or whose password is stored somewhere on the machine is equivalent to plain text storage. There’s no obvious solution other than ensuring the system can’t be rooted without a login, I’m just pointing the flaw out in case you feel it’s more secure than it is.
Wait, how’s this gonna help? If someone swipes the machine, they also have the TPM. TPM only helps against someone reading the disks on another machine. TPM is only useful to protect data during physical access if the rest of the firmware/software stack is impenetrable. In practical terms this would mean locked UEFI, disabled alternate boot device, Secure Boot, locked GRUB, and locked logins. In effect the security of the data is transferred from the knowledge of a passphrase to the knowledge of a login password, and the attack surface is expanded across multiple systems that all have to be secure and configured correctly to not allow access prior to OS login.
Imagine him losing to an AOC type. 💦