Hallucination has been widely recognized to be a significant drawback for large
language models (LLMs). There have been many works that attempt to reduce the
extent of hallucination. These efforts have mostly been empirical so far, which
cannot answer the fundamental question whether it can be completely eliminated.
In this paper, we formalize the problem and show that it is impossible to eliminate
hallucination in LLMs. Specifically, we define a formal world where hallucina-
tion is defined as inconsistencies between a computable LLM and a computable
ground truth function. By employing results from learning theory, we show that
LLMs cannot learn all of the computable functions and will therefore always hal-
lucinate. Since the formal world is a part of the real world which is much more
complicated, hallucinations are also inevitable for real world LLMs. Furthermore,
for real world LLMs constrained by provable time complexity, we describe the
hallucination-prone tasks and empirically validate our claims. Finally, using the
formal world framework, we discuss the possible mechanisms and efficacies of
existing hallucination mitigators as well as the practical implications on the safe
deployment of LLMs.
Yes definitely. Many of my fellow NLP researchers would disagree with those researchers and philosophers (not sure why we should care about the latter’s opinions on LLMs).
it’s using tokens, which are more like concepts than words
You’re clearly not an expert so please stop spreading misinformation like this.
researchers and philosophers (not sure why we should care about the latter’s opinions on LLMs).
Philosophers may not be represent an authory on the mechanics of LLMs, but in a discussion of the nature consciousness (which is really what the stochastic parrot stuff is about), their opinion is as valid as anyone elses, and they have one of the richer histories of conceptualizing it, long before more rigorous empirical disciplines could dream of doing so.
Yes definitely. Many of my fellow NLP researchers would disagree with those researchers and philosophers (not sure why we should care about the latter’s opinions on LLMs).
I’m not sure what you’re saying here - do you mean you do or don’t think LLMs are “stochastic parrot”s?
In any case, the reason I would care about philosophers opinions on LLMs is mostly because LLMs are already making “the masses” think they’re potentially sentient, and or would deserve personhood. What’s more concerning is that the academics that sort of define what thinking even is seem confused by LLMs if you take the “stochastic parrot” POV. This eventually has real world affects - it might take a decade or two, but these things spread.
I think this is a crazy idea right now, but I also think that going into the future eventually we’ll need to have something like a TNG “Measure of a Man” trial about some AI, and I’d want to get that sort of thing right.
You are not logged in. However you can subscribe from another Fediverse account, for example Lemmy or Mastodon. To do this, paste the following into the search field of your instance: !technology@beehaw.org
A nice place to discuss rumors, happenings, innovations, and challenges in the technology sphere. We also welcome discussions on the intersections of technology and society. If it’s technological news or discussion of technology, it probably belongs here.
Remember the overriding ethos on Beehaw: Be(e) Nice. Each user you encounter here is a person, and should be treated with kindness (even if they’re wrong, or use a Linux distro you don’t like). Personal attacks will not be tolerated.
Yes definitely. Many of my fellow NLP researchers would disagree with those researchers and philosophers (not sure why we should care about the latter’s opinions on LLMs).
You’re clearly not an expert so please stop spreading misinformation like this.
Philosophers may not be represent an authory on the mechanics of LLMs, but in a discussion of the nature consciousness (which is really what the stochastic parrot stuff is about), their opinion is as valid as anyone elses, and they have one of the richer histories of conceptualizing it, long before more rigorous empirical disciplines could dream of doing so.
I’m not sure what you’re saying here - do you mean you do or don’t think LLMs are “stochastic parrot”s?
In any case, the reason I would care about philosophers opinions on LLMs is mostly because LLMs are already making “the masses” think they’re potentially sentient, and or would deserve personhood. What’s more concerning is that the academics that sort of define what thinking even is seem confused by LLMs if you take the “stochastic parrot” POV. This eventually has real world affects - it might take a decade or two, but these things spread.
I think this is a crazy idea right now, but I also think that going into the future eventually we’ll need to have something like a TNG “Measure of a Man” trial about some AI, and I’d want to get that sort of thing right.